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both the keepers of the academic flame and the stewards of public
money. Beyond that, universities also may benefit from the substantial
royalty dollars that flow when pharmaceutical companies purchase
licenses. Like a well-oiled machine, universities should be able to
smoothly and cleanly integrate these roles. Nevertheless, when the
entire system is suffering shocks, these roles may come into conflict
particularly when the yearning for royalty green may be in tension with
the responsible stewardship of largesse from the public purse. This
piece suggests a way in which universities can be faithful to all of the
disparate masters, serving as an elegant model of market efficiency and
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With this perspective in mind, this piece suggests using university
contracts as pathways for ensuring that innovations developed using
federal funds sufficiently benefit those who have funded it. In brief the
paper identifies five potential ways in which contractual requirements
could prove valuable and addresses navigating potential roadblocks to
the implementation of these types ofprovisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States' drug development and delivery
system has loomed in the forefront of pressing policy concerns. Drug
spending has risen to staggering levels and at a faster rate than any other
aspect of health care spending, including hospitalization and nursing
care.' Perverse incentives in the reimbursement system, including
secretive rebates and clawbacks,2 drive the system towards higher priced
drugs, and drug companies increasingly find ways to delay generic
1. Aimee Picci, Martin Skreheli-Style Drug Price Hikes are Everywhere, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nartin-shkreli-style-drug-price-hikes-are-
everywhere/ (citing Robert Langreth & Rebecca Spalding, Shkreli Was Right; Everyone's
Hiking Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2,2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/shkreli-not-alone-in-drug-price-
spikes-as-skin-gel-soars-1-860) (noting that "[a]bout 20 of the top prescription drugs have at
least quadrupled" their prices from 2014 to 2016); see Murray Aitken, Understanding the
Dynamics of Drug Expenditure, QUINTILES IMS INSTITUTE, Sept. 2017, at 6-7 (noting that
net drug expenditure in the U.S. increased from $335 per person in 1995 to $974 per person
in 2015).
2. Instances in which Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) pay pharmacists too little to
support wholesale acquisition of the drug or charge patients an inflated cost for drug. See
ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES 49-50 (Cambridge 2019).
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competitors and block competition.3 Even some industry executives are
beginning to acknowledge the problems and express discomfort with the
current state of affairs.4
Despite calls for various solutions and arguments leveled against
the proposals, the problem persists.5 There is no magic bullet, and this
piece does not claim to provide a remedy to all that ails the drug industry.
3. Id. at 49-50 (noting that because of the perverse incentives in the reimbursement
system, PBMs and drug companies can pressure insurance plans and pharmacies to pay more
for drugs than they should); id. at 11 (showing that "invoice price increases on protected drug
brands" have been "a significant driver of growth" in drug expenditures in the U.S. between
1996 and 2015); Aitken, supra note 1; FELDMAN, supra note 2; Jennifer L. Graber, Excessive
Pricing of Off-Patent Pharmaceutical: Hatch it or Ratchet?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1146, 1180
(2017); see ALTARUM INST. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE HEALTH SPENDING, HEALTH SECTOR
ECONOMIC INDICATORS: INSIGHTS FROM NATIONAL MONTHLY PRICE INDICES THROUGH
JULY 2015 (Sept. 11, 2015), http://altarum.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-related-
files/CSHS-Price-Brief September 2015.pdf; see also Robin Feldman, Afay Your Drug Price
be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590, 601-04 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/Isy022
[hereinafter Feldman, Evergreen]; see generally Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski,
Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016).
4. Caroline Chen & Robert Langreth, Gilead Executive Says Pharmacy Benefit
Managers Keep Prices High, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-03/gilead-executive-says-phamacy-
benefit-managers-keep-prices-high (Gilead executive pointing to PBMs and saying that, "[i]f
we just lowered the cost of Sovaldi from $85,000 to $50,000, every payer would rip up our
contract"); see, e.g., Anita Balakrishnan, 3Mlylan CEO on EpiPens: The System Rewards
Higher Prices, CNBC (Aug. 25, 2016) (Mylan CEO's saying, "No one's more frustrated than
me ... My frustration is, the list price is $608. There is a system. I laid out that there are four
or five hands that he product touches, and companies that it goes through before it ever gets
to that patient at the counter. Everyone should be frustrated. I'm hoping that this is an
inflection point for this country.").
5. Thomas Sullivan, Both Houses of Congress Investigating Prescription Drug Prices,
POL'Y & MED. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.policymed.com2015/l11/both-houses-of-
congress-investigating-prescription-drug-prices.html (outlining the "bipartisan Senate
investigation into pharmaceutical drug pricing"); Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar,
Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drug-companies-pushed-from-far-and-wide-
to-explain-high-prices.html (discussing initiatives by various states to bring transparency and
potentially even price controls); Joanna Shepherd, The Prescription for Rising Drug Prices:
Competition or Price Controls?, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 315, 346 (2017) (noting that "[r]ecent
surges in drug spending have provoked anger and prompted calls for reform" including
demands for price controls); see Meg Tirrell & Dan Mangan, Clinton Calls Drug Price Hike
'Outrageous, ' Vows Plan, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www. cnbc.com/2015/09/21/clinton-calls-drug-price-hike-outrageous-vows-plan.html
(noting Clinton's calls "to control the cost of skyrocketing prescription drugs"); see also
Alison Kodjak, One Way to Force Down Drug Prices: Have the U.S. Exercise Its Patent
Rights, NPR (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shot
s/20 17/03 /16/520390026/one -way-to-force-down-drug-prices-have-the-u-s-exercise-its-
patent-rights (describing Rep. Lloyd Doggett's calls for the government o exercise march-in
rights); see generally ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET (Cambridge University Press 1st ed.
2017).
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Rather, this piece suggests a pathway that could provide opportunities
for progress with aspects of the problem. In contrast to the complex
twists and turns of the Hatch-Waxman Act (for rapid entry of generic
small molecule drugs), the convoluted byways of the Biosimilars Act
(for entry of follow-on biologic drugs), and the truly impenetrable
Affordable Care Act, this proposal is relatively simple. Through the
addition of a few choice provisions in their licensing agreements,
research universities could improve consumer choices and access to the
drugs developed with their government-funded research.
Looking at the entire drug development system, universities play a
complex set of roles. They are both the keepers of the academic flame
and the stewards of public money.6 Beyond that, universities also may
benefit from the substantial royalty dollars that flow when
pharmaceutical companies purchase licenses. Like a well-oiled
machine, universities should be able to smoothly and cleanly integrate
these roles. Nevertheless, when the entire system is suffering shocks,
these roles may come into conflict-particularly when the yearning for
royalty green may be in tension with the responsible stewardship of
largesse from the public purse. This piece suggests a way in which
universities can be faithful to all of the disparate masters, serving as an
elegant model of market efficiency and responsible action.
II. FUNDING AND RESEARCH IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT
The notion begins at the cradle of pharmaceutical innovation. As a
general matter, pharmaceutical companies are rather unsuccessful at
developing breakthrough drugs, and most pharmaceutical innovation
happens at research universities or smaller companies.7  Moreover, a
substantial amount of university research is subsidized by the
government, with the federal government regularly providing grants to
graduate programs at universities working on drug development or
6. Andrew K. Cordova & Robin Feldman, Universities and Patent Demands, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 717,718 (2015).
7. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Big Pharma, Short on Blockbusters, Outsources the Science,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-phanna-short-on-blockbusters-
outsources-the-science-1481042583 (citing a Boston Consulting Group study stating that
about 70 percent of drug industry's new sales in 2016 come from drugs originated in small
companies, up from 30 percent in 1990); see Robert Kneller, The importance of new
companies for drug discovery: origins of a decade of new drugs, NATURE REVIEWS DRUG
DISCOVERIES 9, 867, 869 (2010) (comprehensive study of 252 drugs approved by the FDA
between 1998 and 2007 stating that of drugs that were considered " scientifically novel," only
44% were from pharmaceutical companies, while 25% were frombiotech companies and 3 1%
were from universities); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare
Diseases, and Repurposing in the Development of the Afost Transformative Drugs, 34
HEALTH AFFAIRS 286 (2015) (study finding that more than half of 26 transformative drugs
approved by the 1984 and 2009 had origins in publicly funded research).
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researching tools that aid in the drug development process.8 Although
the amount of federal funding has declined since a high in 2008, the
federal government provided $24.6 billion in university research grants
in 2013.9 Meanwhile, universities also receive substantial funding from
federal financial aid programs, like Pell Grants, as well as additional
financial aid grants and general-purpose appropriations from state
budgets.10 In 2013, universities received over $120 billion in non-
research specific funding from federal and state budgets."
In addition to the benefit of public largesse through direct funding,
universities also enjoy a special advantage benefit for any patents
granted as a result of their research efforts. Since 2011, those who are
accused of infringing a patent that originated through university research
do not get the benefit of a "prior use" defense, in contrast to those
accused of violating any other patents.'2 These funding and assertion
benefits provide enormous value to universities, presumably with the
hope that their research activities will redound to the benefit of the
taxpayers who are funding this exploration.
All this being said, money from licensing remains a small part of
overall funding, and in most cases it barely covers the cost of operating
a tech transfer office.' 3 According to a study from the Brookings
Institute, at 13% of research schools the one-third of licensing fees that
go to a university's general fund barely cover the cost of operating a tech
8. Stephen V. Frye et al., Academic Drug Discovery in the US: A Survey and Analysis,
10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 409, 410 (2011) (stating that in a 2011 survey of
Academic Drug Discovery centers, federal grants or contracts accounted for an average of
41% of total funding, by far the largest source of financial support for ADD centers); see, e.g.,
Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research,
30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953 (2012); see also NIH, NAT'L CANCER INST., PRECLINICAL
THERAPEUTIC GRANTS BRANCH, (2018) (the NIH research grants arm that supports
preclinical anticancer drug discovery and treatment strategies).
9. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 3 (2015).
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id. Many medicines currently on our shelves began with government funded
research. In fact, research funded by the NIH was associated with every one of the 210 new
drugs approved by the FDA between 2010 and 2016. Pharmaceutical companies perform
critical work in testing, approving, commercializing, and mass producing the innovation, the
taxpayers have been there from the start. See Ekaterina Cleary et al., Contribution of NIH
funding to new drug approvals 2010-2016, 115 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 2329 (2018).
12. See Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally
Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953, 953-54 (2012).
13. Walter D. Valdivia, University Startups: Critical for Improving Technology
Transfer, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS (2013).
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transfer office. 14 Moreover, the great majority of research schools fail
to turn patents into an income stream.15
The system's design allows, and even encourages, universities to
sell or license the intellectual property rights in their inventions to
pharmaceutical companies.16 After all, if the goal is to translate basic
research into products for the public good, someone must actually do the
translation, and universities are in the business of shaping minds, rather
than producing products. As a result, the companies that develop these
products ultimately benefit from taxpayer supported research funding as
well, yet it is all part of a system intended to stimulate innovation and
redound to the benefit of the public.
As the system winds its way from federal funds to private products,
the government does not relinquish all its interests. University patents
derived from government-funded research must include "government
interest" statements as a result of information provided by the patent
applicant.'7 Such statements provide notice that the patented invention
was funded, at least in part, by federal dollars and that the government
retains a so-called "march-in right," a rarely used patent provision
allowing the government to ignore patent rights and grant a license to
competitors to produce the drug.'8 Research has shown, however, that
such notice and reporting are woefully incomplete, and these statements
are frequently omitted.'9
Although formal mention of the trailing government interest may
slide into the dustbin, the public origin of these inventions remains.
These innovations are imbued with the public interest-not just because
they benefit from the government's grant of a patent, but more
importantly, because their existence flows directly from the largesse of
the public treasury. With this perspective in mind, using university
14. See id. at 9. The other two-thirds of the funding goes to the researchers and their
academic departments. See id.
15. Id.; see also Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence From a Survey
of University Investors in Computer Science and Engineering, 16 YALE J. L. TECH. 285, 301-
05 (2014).
16. Chester G. Moore, Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155 (2006) (noting "extraordinary growth" in university
technology transfer since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act); see Robin Feldman & Mark
A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Aean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 174-
75 (2015) (describing the changes in university licensing since the passage of the 1980 Bayh-
Dole Act); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 36 n.170 (2016).
17. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-242, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED INVENTIONS NEED REVISION 4-6,
20 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99242.pdf.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2019).
19. See, e.g., Rai & Sampat, supra note 8, at 954-55.
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contracts as a pathway for ensuring that innovations developed using
federal funds sufficiently benefit those who have funded it.
III. TRANSFERS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM UNIVERSITIES TO
PHARMA COMPANIES
Under the Bayh-Dole Act of the early 1980s, Congress granted
universities the opportunity to patent and license the inventions created
with federal research money, reversing a long-standing policy in which
the federal government served as the vehicle for such activity.20 Prior to
the Act, the federal government had proven less than stellar at
intellectual property licensingz.2  The goal of the Act was to stimulate
licensing of federally funded inventions and encourage the translation of
those inventions into products, all for the benefit of the public.22 The
Bayh-Dole Act has been stunningly successful, resulting in a wealth of
productivity. 3  One should not underestimate the breathtaking
innovations that have resulted from university research translated into
pharmaceutical products.
Stimulated by the potential for licensing revenue, research
universities maintain technology transfer offices, which typically control
the use of technology developed by the university and develop strategies
to monetize such technologies.2 4 This may be accomplished through
licensing agreements requiring the payment of royalties.2 5  While
universities sometimes publish sample licensing agreements for
reference, the terms of these agreements may be the subject of lengthy
negotiations.2 6 Among other possibilities, these negotiations can expand
geographical regions, provide for exclusivity, or simply adjust the
percentage of the royalty paid to the relevant university. These
20. COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 1-2 (1999).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2.
23. COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999),
https://www.cogr.edu/sites/default/files/TheBayh-DoleAct-
A Guide to the Law and ImplementingRegulations.pdf.
24. Donald S. Siegel & Mike Wright, University Technology Transfer Offices, Licensing,
and Start-Ups, in THE CHICAGO HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1-2 (Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel, & Mike Wright eds.,
2014).
25. Id. at 5.
26. See Markus Perkmann & Joel West, Open Science and Open Innovation: Sourcing
Knowledge from Universities, in THE CHICAGO HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER AND ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 51 (Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel, &
Mike Wright eds., 2014) ("As university policies on intellectual property have become
increasingly ambitious, negotiations over terms and conditions of the contracts between firms
and universities can become arduous and long-lasting.").
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provisions create the mechanism by which government policy and the
public interest can be protected.27
From an institutional competence perspective, universities occupy
an unusually advantageous position. At the end of the day, drug
companies are profit-making enterprises that will operate according to
the incentive structures within the system. Drug companies who eschew
the highest profit opportunities may get hammered by their
shareholders.28 As one drug company executive noted, "[e]verybody has
to make money. Should it be surprising? We do serve different
stakeholders. 29
Although Congress could respond by altering the incentive
structure to which drug companies are responding, legislators are
plagued by their own incentive structures, which may drive the system
away from effective change. These include, quite simply, the modem
need for extensive campaign funds and the power of the pharmaceutical
industry's contribution efforts.30
Unlike Congress, universities stand in an unusual position.
Universities are in the business of education, attracting the optimal mix
of students and the optimal mix of faculty.3' Education is a complex
business, with competing pressures and incentives. For example, recent
empirical research suggests that although university licensing frequently
leads to new products and innovation, when universities behave in a
manner similar to patent trolls-entities who make no products but assert
patents against product-producing companies- the results lack those
27. See id at 47.
28. For example, when AbbVie released Mavyret, a lower cost hepatitis C treatment to
compete with Gilead's notoriously expensive Sovaldi, market analysts anticipated AbbVie's
revenue contribution from Mavyret to be comparatively limited. See Emma Court, Abb Vie's
new, cheaper hepatitis C drug could launch the drug world's own Hunger Games,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/abbvies-new-cheaper-
hepatitis-c-drug-could-launch-the-drug-worlds-own-hunger-games-2017-08-04.
29. See Robin Feldman, Pharma Companies Fight Behind-the-Scenes Wars on Generic
Drugs, STAT (June 16, 2017), https://www.statnews.com!2017/06/16/generic-drugs-
biosimilars-pharma/.
30. In the 2018 election cycle, Pharmaceutical companies have contributed nearly $18
million in PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates. Pharmaceuticals/Health Products,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.phptxt=H04&cycle=2018
[last visited Oct. 6, 2019]; see also Jay Hancock et al, Follow The Money: Drugmakers Deploy
Political Cash As Prices And Anger Mount, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 24, 2017),
https://khn.org/news/follow-the-money-drugmakers-deploy-political-cash-as-prices-and-
anger-mount/.
31. Madeyv. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (University-sanctioned
research projects "further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating
and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects" as well as "increas[ing]
the status of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants, students and faculty.").
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positive indicia.3 2  Nevertheless, as noted above, licensing income
remains a less significant aspect of a university's business, either f om
the perspective of economics or mission.
33
IV. SUGGESTED CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
If licensing provides a potential pathway, what types of provisions
could research universities use to help rationalize a system that is
experiencing such stress? In designing any such provision, one must be
careful not to chill the pharmaceutical industry's incentive for licensing
drugs and research technology from universities.34 Rather, any provision
should be designed to help correct the market imperfections that are
impeding a healthy and robust pharmaceutical market.
The suggestions below build on research by one of the authors,
regarding the drivers of incentive distortions within the industry.35 They
provide examples of the way in which the university pathway could be
utilized.
A. Transparency
Competition is the backbone of U.S. industry.3 6 The intellectual
property system suspends competition for a period of time, conferring
exclusivity for the express purpose of allowing innovators to recoup their
investments and thereby creating the incentive for innovation.
Nevertheless, once that period of exclusivity ends, competition should
reign freely. Competitors should enter the market-driving prices
down-and innovators should have the incentive to return to the lab and
look for new discoveries that will initiate, once again, the cycle of
innovation and profiting from exclusion.37 The reality, however, defies
this model.
To begin with, markets thrive on information, which is a key raw
material of competition. In the pharmaceutical industry, however,
information about the true pricing of drugs remains scarce.3" The true
32. Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, The Sound and Fury of Patent Activity, 103
MINN. L. REV. 1793, 1794-96 (2019).
33. Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands' Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWAL. REV. 137, 174-75 (2015).
34. See Kneller, supra note 7.
35. FELDMAN, supra note 2; see Feldman, Evergreen, supra note 3.
36. Treating the Opioid Epidemic: The State of Competition in the AarketsforAddiction
Aedicine: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Com. &Antitrust L., 114th Cong.
55 (2016) (statement of Robin C. Feldman, Harry and Lillian Hastings Professor of Law,
Director of the Institute for Innovation Law, UC Hastings College of the Law).
37. See, e.g., FELDMAN &FRONDORF, supra note 5, at 138.
38. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 2, for an expanded description of the role of
transparency in market innovation that is described in this paragraph.
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prices of medications are hidden within the layers of complex contracts
between pharmaceutical companies and middle players. These contracts
are treated as fiercely guarded secrets, such that health insurance
companies and even governmental payors, do not have full access to the
information. Buying blind is never a good circumstance for markets, let
alone for fostering competition. Lack of information creates distortions
in the market. It hobbles small and medium-sized competitors, who have
less ability than powerful, entrenched players to gain access to this key
competitive material. Secrecy also creates barriers for state and federal
authorities trying to find and repair their own policies that may be
distorting markets. Neither circumstance promotes a full flowering of
the competitive ideal. In recognition of the importance of transparency,
numerous states are contemplating approaches for mandating
transparency in various aspects of the pharmaceutical industry.39 Other
bills have contemplated stronger regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry, for example, through price controls.40
University licensing could complement and enhance transparency
efforts. For example, a standard university license could require that
those who use university technology must agree to provide open-pricing
information: either for a) the drug being licensed; b) any drugs innovated
through use of a tool, if pharmaceutical technology is being transferred;
or c) any improvements made to the core technology or innovation being
licensed. Such open pricing information has the potential to generate
competitive pressures in the market that will ultimately be more
successful than public price controls.4' Thinking even more
expansively, an enlightened and enterprising university could establish
a system for publishing and tracking such information, providing a
service to competition and to government agencies wishing to track the
success of their funding efforts.
B. Behavioral Limitations
In addition to stipulating transparency, universities could include
behavioral limitations within their licensing agreements-limitations
that could enhance the public interest and combat other types of market
imperfections embodied in the pharmaceutical and health care industry.
39. State Legislative Action to Lower Pharmaceutical Costs, NAT'L ACAD. FOR ST.
HEALTH POL'Y (updated June 22, 2018), https://nashp.org/state-legislative-action-on-
pharmaceutical-prices/ (listing states with bills or passed transparency legislation including
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin).
40. Id. at 2.
41. See FELDMAN, supra note 2, at 96-97 (discussing the merits of price transparency).
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For example, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that
pharmaceutical companies have developed a practice of utilizing
additional patents and other exclusivities to extend their monopoly
period and hold off what is known as the "patent cliff '- that is, the point
at which generics will join the market.4 2 A recent study by one of the
authors found that "[O]f the roughly 100 best-selling drugs, more than
70% extended their protection at least once, with almost 50% extending
the protection cliff more than once.43 Moreover, "[a]lmost 40% of all
drugs available on the market created additional market barriers by
adding patents or exclusivities., 44  Other studies have documented
troubling behavior in filing citizen petitions at the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and in refusing to provide samples to generic
companies applying for approval .
45
Finally, the patent market in general has been plagued by non-
practicing entities (NPEs), who make no products but assert patents
against product-producing companies.46 NPEs are known colloquially as
"patent trolls. 47 Academic works have described the way in which such
entities exploit market imperfections to extract returns above the value
of their patents.4 A recent National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded
42. See generally Robin Feldman, Afay Your Drug Price be Evergreen, J. OF L. &
BIOSCIENCES 590 (Dec. 2018).
43. Id. at 597, 618.
44. Id.
45. Robin Feldman, Evan Frondorf, Andrew K. Cordova, & Connie Wang, Empirical
Evidence of Drug Pricing Games -A Citizen's Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
39, 44 (2017) (empirical study detailing the extent to which citizen petitions filed at the FDA
are used as last-ditch efforts by pharmaceutical companies to hold off generic entry); Michael
A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 249,
251-52 (2012) (empirical study finding that brand drug companies filed the majority of total
citizen petitions filed between 2001-2010); see FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 5, at 81-
90 (discussing game-playing related to providing samples for generics).
46. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 38 (2012) [hereinafter FELDMAN,
RETHINKING].
47. Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE
RECORDER (July 30, 2001).
48. Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L., BUS., & FIN. 250, 264
(2013); Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1-2 (Fall 2013); Colleen V. Chien,
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-
Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573-74 (2009); James E. Bessen, Jennifer Ford &
Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, 26 (Winter
2011-2012); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1309,
1310-12 (2013); Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 482-83 (2014); see Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among
Us, 1 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent
Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629-30 (2008) (distinguishing
between universities as non-practicing entities and trolls).
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study by one of the authors demonstrated that patent assertion by NPEs
rarely leads to new products or markers of innovation.49 Most important,
the study showed that when universities behave in a manner similar to
patent trolls-engaging in ex post assertion of patents against product-
producing companies-the results also lack markers of innovation.5 °
University licensing provisions could be crafted to discourage any
of these types of behaviors. On a granular level, university licenses
could be drafted to forbid particular behaviors, such as obtaining follow-
on patents on the invention that make minor modifications, refusing to
provide samples to generic hopefuls, or filing citizen petitions to block
generic entry. On a broader level, universities could choose to follow
the lead of companies that have entered into patent consortiums in which
the relevant licenses allow use of the patent, but do not allow the
licensees to bring any claims for patent infringement.51 Other potential
license provisions-not to mention university policies-could provide
that the technology must be used for creating a product or service, rather
than for monetization through an NPE. Measures such as these could
help ensure that publicly funded research goes to the production of
products for the benefit of society, rather than getting lost in
weaponization.
Although the thrust of the transparency and behavioral suggestions
is aimed at ensuring the public interest for publicly funded research,
competition benefits the public in all circumstances. Thus, although
most appropriate for publicly funded research, a forward-thinking
university could choose to include these provisions in the licensing of
any university technology. Such an approach would reflect the
leadership role that universities play, not only in shaping young minds,
but also in shaping the future.
V. IS PATENT MISUSE A ROADBLOCK?
While the United States justice system typically supports the rights
of private parties to contract, there are limitations. For contracts
involving patents, one such limitation is imposed by the doctrine of
patent misuse. The doctrine of patent misuse forbids patent misuse,
which occurs when a patent holder attempts to improperly extend the
49. See Feldman & Lemley, supra note 16.
50. See id
51. See, e.g., Ina Fried, Google Joins Stable of Tech Companies Licensing their LTE
Patents as a Group, RECODE (Apr. 9, 2015),
https://www.recode.net/2015/4/9/11561306/google-joins-stable-of-tech-companies-
licensing-their-ite-patents-as; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & F.T.C., ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) at 28 (in which
pooling arrangements are looked upon favorably as potentially having "procompetitive
benefits").
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time and scope of its patent beyond that given by the grant.52 As an
equitable defense to a claim of patent infringement, the doctrine does not
invalidate a patent.3 Instead, it renders the patent unenforceable until
the misuse ends and the effects of the behavior have dissipated.54
Patent misuse is a longstanding doctrine, originally invoked over a
hundred years ago by infringement defendants who alleged that the
patent holder was attempting to improperly extend its monopoly through
the enforcement of its patent right.55 Since that time, courts have
repeatedly used the doctrine to keep a patent holder's patent power in
check, particularly in the licensing context.56 While patent misuse has
been largely a judicially created defense, Congress has articulated five
categories of conduct that do not constitute patent misuse.57 Today, the
types of contractual agreements that can constitute patent misuse include
royalty payments beyond the scope or term of the patent,58 grant back
52. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343-44
(1971).
53. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("Patent misuse arises in equity, and a holding of misuse renders the patent unenforceable
until the misuse is purged; it does not, of itself, invalidate the patent.").
54. Id.
55. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)
(refusing to enforce a patent where the licensees were obligated to require purchasers of the
patented film projector to use only film made by patent owner: "[T]o enforce it would be to
create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films, wholly outside of the
patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.").
56. See FELDMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 46, at 137-42 (citing Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., Co., 243 U.S. 514 18 (1917)).
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2019).
58. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30, 32 (1964) (held that an agreement
licensing a patented hop-picking machine to farmers in exchange for royalties from hop crops
harvested both before and after the patents' expiration dates was "unlawful per se" to the
extent it provided for the payment of royalties that "accrue after the last of the patents
incorporated into the machines had expired.").
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arrangements,5 9 price regulation,60 and where market power is shown,
tying arrangements6' and compulsory packaging licensing.62
Here, most of the suggested Good Behavior provisions bear no
resemblance in form or substance to these traditional forms of potential
patent misuse conduct.63 Yet arguably, the university would be using its
patent to obtain something beyond the physical scope of its patent: the
licensee's Good Behavior. Does a Good Behavior License run afoul of
the patent misuse doctrine?
A. The Purpose of the Patent Misuse Doctrine
The primary purpose of the patent system is to promote the progress
of science for the public benefit.64 This purpose is longstanding; in 1945
59. A grantback agreement or clause requires the licensee to give the patent holder rights
in products that the licensee develops. While the Supreme Court has held that grantbacks are
not per se unlawful, see Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637, 648 (1947), where courts tend to find misuse where the grantback provision reaches too
broadly. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 712-13 (D.S.C.
1977) (finding patent misuse where gratback provision would have included patents
developed by the licensee that could not be characterized as a mere improvement on the
licensor's invention), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (use
of nonexclusive grantback license to perpetuate patent monopoly after patent expiration is
unlawful); Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 893, 904-05 (D.
Mass. 1980) (describing overbroad gratbacks as classic patent misuse and citing
Transparent- Wrap for the proposition that a license provision requiring that the licensee grant
back all its own patents to the licensor might constitute patent misuse), aff'd 649 F.2d 871 (1st
Cir. 1981).
60. See Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1,8, 18 (1913) (stating that a patentee cannot
fix the price at which a patented article lawfully purchased from the patentee could be resold
as the original sale exhausted the patent right).
61. In a tying agreement, a patent holder equires licensees to buy unpatented goods (tie-
in) or prevent licensees from using, producing or selling a competitor's product (tie-out).
Historically, tie-in and tie-out arrangements have been held to be misuse per se based on an
assumption that a patent confers market power on the patent holder. See Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942). In 1988, Congress amended the patent law
to require a showing of market power in the relevant market for the patented product for tie-
in arrangements to constitute misuse. See Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988; see also Ill.
Tool Works v. Independent Ink, 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) ("[I]n all cases involving a tying
arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying
product.") (emphasis added).
62. Compulsory packaging licensing occurs when a licensee is forced to accept a broader
package of unwanted patents in order to get the desired patent. In other words, the availability
of the desired patent is conditioned on acceptance of unwanted patents. Such coercive
packaging licensing can constitute patent misuse, and a showing of market power is required
to establish misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltinen
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 134, 139-40 (1969) (package license in which licensor refused
to grant licenses to individual patents but insisted on granting license to any of the company's
500-odd patents could constitute patent misuse).
63. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
64. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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the United States Supreme Court explained, "[t]he primary purpose of
our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of
the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of
advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a
certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure.65
To help achieve this ultimate goal, patent law confers on a patent
holder a limited monopoly or right, for twenty years, to exclude others
from "making, using, offering for sale, or selling [his] invention.,66 The
extent of a patent holder's exclusionary right is limited by the definition
of the invention and the twenty-year term.67 In crafting the patent laws,
Congress attempted to strike a balance "between fostering innovation
and ensuring public access to discoveries.,
6
In this nation's history, Congress's choice to allow an inventor to
temporarily exclude others is a decidedly utilitarian endeavor. We are
not led down this pathway because of the inherent natural right of an
inventor; we travel that road for the purpose of bringing benefit to all by
incentivizing innovation. The effect of this choice is inherently
anticompetitive, at least in the short term. In this anticompetitive grant,
patents run smack up against antitrust law, which promotes competition
more directly and in the short term .6 9 In order to mark the boundary line
between the two domains-patent and antitrust-the Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of patent misuse in a series of cases, beginning
with Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 70 The doctrine
sought to prevent the use of patents as an end-run around antitrust laws.7 '
Without the doctrine, patent holders were able to claim that any
anticompetitive behavior was insulated by virtue of the presence of a
patent in the transaction.72 As the Supreme Court has explained, without
the doctrine, "[p]rivate business would function as its own patent office
and impose its own law upon its licensees.,73 The boundary drawn was
65. Sinclair& Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2019).
67. See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
68. Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406-07 (2015).
69. See generally Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface,
3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. & POL'Y 1979, 1979 (2008); Robin Feldman, Patent & Antitrust:
Differing Shades ofA leaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2008).
70. 243 U.S. 502 (1917); see also Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 494
(1942), overruled on other grounds by Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006);
LeitchIMfg. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents
Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-35 (1931).
71. See FELDMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 46, at 137-42.
72. Id.
73. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944).
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patent misuse, defined as "attempts to broaden the physical or temporal
scope of the patent monopoly.,
74
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that patent misuse should
be tested under patent law principles, not those of antitrust.75 The notion
is that when a patent holder acts within the scope of the patent, the law
would stay the hand of antitrust; when a patent holder acts outside its
scope, antitrust could have full rein.7 6 The core of the notion was simply
that patent law would be allowed to limit competition and foster
exclusion in the service of the greater good of long-term innovation;
secure in the knowledge that the suppression of competition would be
limited in both time and scope. 77 In time, upon the patent's expiration,
competition would come roaring back, bringing the promise of even
greater follow on innovation and competition. After all, patents are not
trade secrets. Society asks patent holders to pay for their temporary right
to exclude by facilitating the next generation of innovation, those who
can quickly knock the originator off its lofty perch.78
While certain behaviors might violate both patent law and antitrust
law, the showing of an antitrust violation is not required to establish
patent misuse.79 The standards for patent misuse are different from the
standards of an antitrust violation, which generally requires market
power and a showing of anticompetitive harm. 80 Misuse is behavior
determined by patent law.8' The inquiry focuses on whether the behavior
expands the time or scope of a patent in a manner that is inconsistent
with patent law policy.
8 2
B. The Proper Use of Patent Power: Restraining Competition Within
74. Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
75. See, e.g., Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
641 (1947); Alorton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493-94; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
76. See Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 34 n.4 (noting that an attempt to use a patent to
unreasonably restrain commerce is both beyond the scope of the patent and a direct violation
of the antitrust laws); see also Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Afercoid,
320 U.S. at 661; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v.
G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
77. See FELDMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 46, at 137-42.
78. See generally Robin Feldman, The Inventor's Contribution, 9 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6
(2005).
79. See, e.g., Aforton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494 (held on public policy grounds that patent was
unenforceable where patented machine was leased to lessees on condition that lessees use an
unpatented product from patentee; it was "unnecessary" to determine whether an antitrust
violation existed).
80. Id.
81. See FELDMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 46, at 137-42.
82. See Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Alovement: Is It Patent
Mfisuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCi.& TECH. 117, 135 (Dec. 2004).
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the Scope of the Patent Grant
As noted in the past, "[a]t a fundamental level, the intellectual
property system exudes a deep faith in the power of competition.
Competition may be held in abeyance, but those who receive the benefit
of a patent or exclusivity must pay for that privilege by disclosing
sufficient information such that competitors will be able to step into the
market."83
Patent law's notion of competition, however, is quite different from
that of antitrust law. Antitrust is concerned with the clash of the mighty.
Only when a party holds sufficient market power does antitrust deign to
enter.84 In contrast, patent law is concerned with the proper use of the
patent power-regardless of whether market power exists.85  Patent
misuse operates against bad behavior even by the mouse, not just by the
mighty.
Nevertheless, the wrong tested with patent misuse is still related to
the harms that antitrust law aims to combat.86 For patent misuse, the
question is whether the patent holder is using its precious and temporary
right to exclude competitors beyond the power in the four comers of the
grant.87 In other words, is the patent holder leveraging its patent to
restrain competition beyond what is permitted?88
Here, the patent holder who writes a Good Behavior License cannot
be said to be restraining competition beyond what is permitted. Good
Behavior provisions that require the licensee to cooperate or not impede
in the generic entry process, for example, would have the procompetitive
effect of accelerating the entry of generic pharmaceuticals into the
marketplace, thereby simulating competition. Likewise, a provision
discouraging the licensee from extending a patent cliff would stimulate
competition because the period of exclusivity would not extend beyond
the patent term. The artificial barrier to competition (the patent) would
83. Robin Feldman, Alay your drug price be evergreen, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590, 592
(peer review) (2018).
84. See Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades ofA leaning, 13 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 10, 18-19 (2008) [hereinafter Feldman, Differing Shades].
85. See generally Robin Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent
Aisuse, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 399 (2003) (describing patent misuse explaining that only in the
case of a tying or compulsory packaging licensing claim does patent misuse require market
power) [hereinafter Feldman, Insufficiency].
86. See generally Feldman, Differing Shades, supra note 84.
87. See Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 136 (discussing the limits of patent power, or "patent
leverage," as when "the patentee seeks to extend the monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit
not attributable to use of the patent's teachings."); see also Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Com'n,
616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("What patent misuse is about, in short, is 'patent
leverage....'").
88. Feldman, Differing Shades, supra note 84, at 4.
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be removed at an earlier time than it would have been had the patent cliff
been extended.
Procompetitive effects also can result from a price transparency
requirement. As previously discussed, the lack of information on the
true price of drugs helps to suppress competition and creates distortions
in the market. Through a price transparency provision, a Good Behavior
License has the potential to generate competitive pressures that would
likely result in lower prices for the end user. And, such provision would
help to mitigate against increased prices that are a natural negative
consequence of the monopoly granted through a patent.89
Far from attempting to restrain competition, the patent holder
through a Good Behavior License is trying to allow competition to
flourish and to ensure that those who use its invention do not over-
enthusiastically or inappropriately constrain others. It is the essence of
90a pro-competitive provision.
C. Does a Good Behavior License Support he Patent Policy of
Innovation for the Public Good?
Innovation is the ultimate goal of our nation's patent system. This
goal is enshrined in our Constitution that authorizes Congress the power
to grant patents for a single purpose: "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts .... "9' Innovation is desirable for many
reasons, not the least of which is its ability to drive growth in the
economy.
Patent misuse concerns the extension of patent rights that hamper
innovation. The importance of innovation to the misuse doctrine is
illustrated in Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,
92 where the licensee granted the patent holder a royalty-free license to
use the improvement. The Supreme Court held that although the grant
back agreement extended the patent term, the agreement did not
constitute patent misuse because it did not diminish the licensee's
incentive to innovate.93 Thus, while the behavior extended the scope of
89. Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 85, at 433 (identifying higher prices charged by
patent holders as a negative effect of patent system).
90. To the extent that a good behavior patent license can be analogized to an open source
software license, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found that an open
source license "does not restrain trade." See Wallace v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 467 F.3d
1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging that defendants
conspired to eliminate competition in the operating system market by making Linux, a free
open-source software, in violation of the federal antitrust laws).
91. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
92. Transparent- Wrap Afachine Corp., 329 U.S. at 638-40.
93. Id. at 645-46.
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the patent, such behavior was not impermissible under patent law
because it was not contrary to the public policy of innovation.
Ironically, the patent system produces some negative effects that
may actually hinder innovation, the very process it is intended to foster
and the reason for its existence. The Good Behavior provisions tend to
lessen these negative effects and thereby promote innovation. Thus,
even if a Good Behavior License were said to expand the scope of the
patent, it seeks to support innovation and therefore, should not offend
the patent misuse doctrine.
By the very nature of the twenty-year patent term, delays in new
inventions are common, if temporary. "[D]elaying the point at which
inventions enter the public domain reduces the benefits society may gain
in terms of a foundation for future innovation. 94 Rather than delay the
entry of inventions, Good Behavior provisions that require the licensee
to cooperate in the generic application process or to forgo extending a
patent cliff would accelerate the entry of new inventions, and thereby
spur future innovation.
Another negative effect of the patent system is the over-
proliferation of patent rights and the resulting "patent thicket.,
95
A patent thicket has been defined as "a dense web of overlapping
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in
order to ... commercialize new technology.,96  Patent thickets
disincentivize downstream inventors by burdening them with the hassle
and attendant costs in obtaining or attempting to obtain permission from
patent holders of overlapping rights.9 7 In this manner, patent thickets
frequently impede rather than promote innovation.9 8
Avoiding or minimizing patent thickets would help downstream
inventors create new products and process for the common good. A
Good Behavior provision that bars a licensee from bringing a patent
94. Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 85, at 435.
95. See Stu Woolman, Elliot Fishman & Michael Fisher, Evidence of Patent Thickets in
Complex Biopharmaceutial Technologies, 53 IDEA at 1, 7 (2013); see also Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,
1 INNOVATION POL'Y & THE ECON. 119, 119 (2001) (a patent thicket is "an overlapping set
of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses
from multiple patentees.").
96. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket, supra note 95, at 120.
97. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6 (2003).
98. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1629 (2003) (in discussing the problem of patent thickets, concludes that "[r]ather than
promoting innovation, patents threaten to impede it or, at best, are deployed to counter the
impeding patent rights of competitors."); see, e.g., Woolman, et al., Evidence of Patent
Thickets, supra note 95, at 1, 27 (empirical study shows that patent thickets tend to impede
innovation in complex biopharmaceuticals).
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infringement claim serves to minimize the thicket. By eliminating the
threat of an infringement lawsuit, such provision would allow
downstream inventors to commercialize their improvements faster and
less expensively, without he trouble and expenses of "cutting through"
the thicket.
Yet another negative effect of the patent system is its
encouragement of duplicative activity, as parties try to invent around
patents held by others rather than build on that work.99 A patent holder's
voluntary relinquishment of an infringement suit would reduce this
unfavorable effect in the same manner as in the patent thicket context.
In addition to mitigating against negative effects of the patent
system, a Good Behavior License tends to promote innovation in other
respects. Take for example a Good Behavior provision that grants the
patent holder the right to use improvements made by the licensee. This
type of grant-back provision promotes innovation because it enables the
patent holder to learn about how its invention has been used and to gain
others' knowledge that can be used by the patent holder for future
inventions.100
The rise of patent trolls and NPEs have moreover shaped the patent
landscape.10 Studies have shown that licenses with NPEs do not
facilitate the development or use of new technology.0 2 And NPEs are
responsible for costly and unmeritorious patent litigation. 03 Given the
high cost of litigation, a rational company may choose to pay a license
fee to a NPE rather than incur the costs and risks of a lawsuit. "The
patent in that case is not benefitting society at all but rather serving as a
drag on innovation."0 4 Because licenses with NPEs/PAEs generally do
not promote innovation and do not benefit society as a whole, they are
inconsistent with patent policy. Therefore, banning such licenses - as a
Good Behavior License would do - would be consistent with patent
policy.
Rather than impede innovation, a Good Behavior License would
have the effect of alleviating many negative consequences of the patent
99. See Feldman, Insufficiency, supra note 85, at 434.
100. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("by requiring
that changes made by downstream user be visible to the copyright holder and others, the
copyright holder learns about the uses of his software and gains others' knowledge that can
be used to advance future software releases"; allowing copyright right infringement claim
based on alleged breaches of an open source software license) (emphasis added).
101. See generally Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands
Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWAL. REV. 137, 139 (2015).
102. See, e.g., id., at 156-66, 173; see also Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Enforcement Efficient?, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 655-58 (2018).
103. See, e.g., Feldman & Lemley, supra note 101, at 152-54.
104. Id. at 140, 152-54.
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system. Such license should not constitute patent misuse because it
seeks to promote innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal funding of university life science research is an important
part of the system that has produced life-saving innovations and helped
preserve the nation's dominant position in the pharmaceutical industry
worldwide. Spending in this manner is unequivocally a public good, and
the translations spurred by the Bayh-Dole Act have brought great benefit
to patients and the health care system. Just as universities have served
as a driving force in research, so too can universities serve as a driving
force for guiding the drug development system out of its current morass.
The challenge in shifting from a for-profit mindset is indeed
substantial. The lure of gold from technology transfer offices can easily
illuminate a less humble path. Nevertheless, without he pressures of
shareholder constraints and political winds, universities are uniquely
situated to act in the highest philosophical and ethical traditions that are
deeply embedded in the academic mission. And indeed, there is a
modicum of self-interest at play, as well. Federal funding continues to
provide a significant source of support for research universities. Right
now, public fury over the cost of medication is aimed at drug companies
and health insurers. If that fury were to turn toward universities and
morph into a movement to kill spending, universities have much to lose.
In an era in which public anger manifests itself in a manner that is fast,
furious, and not always rational, the high ground may be safer, as well.

